

課程資訊 (Course Information)					
科號 Course Number	11020KEC 501700	學分 Credit	3	人數限制 Class Size	0
中文名稱 Course Title	制度分析				
英文名稱 Course English Title	Institutional Analysis				
任課教師 Instructor	鄭國泰(CHENG, KUO-TAI) more information				
上課時間 Time	S5S6S7	上課教室 Room	Nanda南大1203		
提醒您：請遵守智慧財產權，勿使用非法影印教科書 Please respect the intellectual property rights, do not use illegal copies of textbooks.					
此科目對應之系 所課程規畫所欲 培養之核心能力 Core capability to be cultivated by this course					
課程簡述 (Brief course description)					
<p>In this course, to address environmental issues we will have to learn a variety of tools to understand how fallible individuals behave within institutions as well as how they can influence the rules that structure their lives. This is a particularly challenging question in an era when global concerns have moved onto the political agenda of most international, national, and even local governing bodies. Instead of studying how individuals craft institutions, many scholars are focusing on how to understand global phenomena. It is also an era of substantial violence, terrorism, and disruption. Many of the problems we are witnessing today are due to a lack of understanding of the micro and meso levels that are essential aspects of global processes.</p>					
課程大綱 (Syllabus)					
<p>Course keywords: Institution, institutional analysis, IAD, regulation</p> <p>二、指定用書(Text Books) You should have read the entirety of Elinor Ostrom, <i>Governing the Commons</i> (1990) by the third week of the semester; and Amy Poteete, Marco Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom, <i>Working Together</i> (2010) should be read in its entirety by the last week of the semester.</p> <p>三、參考書籍(References) Papers from the International Journal of Commons, 教學方式(Teaching Method) The course will offer an introductory lecture followed by weekly two hour seminars. These seminars will utilise a mix of teaching methods involving a workshop format, small group work, presentations and case study analysis. Each seminar will be led by a student presentation. There are no pre-requisites for this course.</p> <p>四、教學進度(Syllabus)</p> <p>Week 1: Background</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. McGinnis and Walker (2010), "Foundations of the Ostrom Workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance," <i>Public Choice</i> 143: 293-301. 2. Elinor Ostrom, Selections from Fall 2011 Syllabus for Political Science Y673. 3. Elinor Ostrom (2010), "A Long Polycentric Journey," <i>Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.</i> 13: 1-23. 4. McGinnis and E. Ostrom (2012), "Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, Public Administration, and Polycentricity," <i>PAR</i> 12(1): 15-25. 5. Michael D. McGinnis (2011). "Elinor Ostrom: Politics as Problem-Solving in Polycentric Settings," in Donatella Campus, Gianfranco Pasquino, and Martin Bull, eds., <i>Maestri of Political Science</i>, volume 2, Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, pp. 137-158. 6. Singer (2015), "The Indian States of America: Parallel Universes & Overlapping Sovereignty," <i>Amer. Indian L. Rev.</i> 38: 1-33. <p>Week 2: Social ontology: of things and institutions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Searle (1998), "Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society," <i>Analyse&Kritik</i> S.143-158. 2. Denzau& North (1994), "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," <i>Kyklos</i>47: 3-31. 3. V. Ostrom (1980), "Artisanship and Artifact," <i>PAR</i> 40: 309-317. 4. Searle (2005), "What is an institution?" <i>J. Inst. Econ.</i> 1: 1-22. 5. North (1994), "Economic Performance through Time," <i>Amer. Econ. Rev.</i> 84: 359-368. 6. Coase (1992), "The Industrial Structure of Production," <i>Amer. Econ. Rev.</i> 82: 713-719. 					

7. Crawford and E. Ostrom, "A Grammar of Institutions," *Amer. Poli. Sci. Rev.* 89: 582-600.
8. E. Ostrom (1986), "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions," *Public Choice* 48: 3-25.

Week 3: Governance institutions: law and/or social norms

1. Pound (1940-41), "What is Law?" *W. Va. L. Q.* 47: 1-12.
2. Holmes (1896-97), "The Path of the Law," *Boston L. School Mag.* 1: 1-17.
3. Llewellyn (1949), "Law and the Social Sciences," *Amer. Socio. Rev.* 14:451-462.
4. Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990), "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," *Econ. And Pol.* 2: 1-23.
5. Ellickson (1986), "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County," *Stanford L. Rev.* 38: 623-687.
6. R. Posner (1997), "Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach," *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 87: 365-369.
7. Jolls and Sunstein (2006), "Debiasing through Law," *J. Leg. Stud.* 35: 199-242.

Week 4: Commons dilemmas, rational actors, and collective action

1. Arrow (1986), "Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System," *J. Bus.* 59: S385-S399.
2. Simon (1972), "Theories of Bounded Rationality," in C.B. McGuire and R. Rander (eds) *Decision and Organization*, Dordrecht: North-Holland.
3. Cave (1987) "Introduction to Game Theory" RAND Graduate School.
4. Edney and Harper (1978), "The Commons Dilemma: A Review of Contributions from Psychology," *Env't'l Mgt.* 2: 491-507.
5. E. Ostrom (1988), "Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma," in V. Ostrom, Feeney, and Ficht (eds), *Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development*. SF: ICS Press, pp. 103-139.
6. Cole & Grossman (2010), "Institutions matter! Why the Herder Problem is not a Prisoner's Dilemma," *Theory and Decision* 69: 219-231.
7. Nowak (2006), "Five rules for the evolution of cooperation," *Sci.*

Week 5: "Design principles" for sustainable CPR governance

1. Dietz, E. Ostrom, and Stern (2003), "The struggle to govern the commons," *Sci.* 302: 1907-1912.
2. E. Ostrom et al. (1999), "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges," *Sci.* 284: 278-82.
3. E. Ostrom, "Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have We Learned," in Ingram and Hong (eds), *Property rights and land policies*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute.
4. Cox, Arnold, and Villamayor Tomas (2010), "A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management," *Ecol. & Soc.* 15: 38-__.
5. Gutierrez, Hillborn&Defeo (2011), "Leadership, social capital and incentives promote successful fisheries," *Nature* 470: 386-389.
6. Agrawal (2003), "Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and Politics," *Ann. Rev. Anthro.* 32: 243-262.

Week 6: Property and resource governance

1. V. Ostrom & E. Ostrom (1977), "Public Goods and Private Choices," in McGinnis (ed), *Polycentricity and local public economies. Readings from the workshop in political theory and policy analysis*. Ed. Michael McGinnis, Ann Arbor.-University of Michigan Press, 1999.
2. Hardin (1968), "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Sci.* 162: 1243-1248.
3. E. Ostrom, "How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action," *J. Theo. Pol.* 15: 239-270.
4. Schlager&Ostrom (1992), "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," *Land Econ.* 68: 249-262.
5. Clark (1973), "Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species," *J. Pol. Econ.* 81: 950-961.
6. Cole (2015), "'Economic property rights' as 'nonsense upon stilts': a comment on Hodgson," *J. Inst. Econ.* June 1-6.
7. Cole & E. Ostrom (2011), "The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in Natural Resources," in Cole & Ostrom (eds), *Property in Land and Other Resources*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute, pp. 37-64.

Week 7: Analytical frameworks 1: IAD

1. V. Ostrom & E. Ostrom (2004), "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice," *Amer. J. Econ. & Soc.* 63: 105-147.
2. E. Ostrom (1986), "A Method of Institutional Analysis," in Kaufmann et al. (eds), *Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector*. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 459-475.
3. E. Ostrom (2011), "Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development framework," *PSJ* 39: 7-27.
4. McGinnis (2011), "An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a

Complex framework,” PSJ 39: 169-183.

5. McGinnis (2012), “How to Use the IAD framework” (mimeo).

6. McGinnis (2011), “Networks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric Governance,” PSJ 39: 51-78.

7. Cole (forthcoming), “Formal Institutions and the IAD framework: Bringing the Law Back In”

Week 8: Analytical frameworks 2: SES

1. Anderies, Janssen, and E. Ostrom (2004), “A framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective,” *Ecol. & Soc.* 9: 18- .

2. E. Ostrom (2007), “A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas,” *PNAS* 104: 15181-15187.

3. E. Ostrom (2009), “A General framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems,” *Sci.* 325: 419-422.

4. Cox and E. Ostrom (2010), “Moving beyond panaceas: a multi-tiered diagnostic approach for social-ecological analysis,” *Env’tl Conserv.* 37: 451-463.

5. McGinnis & E. Ostrom (2014), “Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and continuing challenges,” *Ecol. & Soc.* 19: 30- .

6. Epstein et al. (2013), “Missing ecology: Integrating ecological perspectives with the social-ecological system framework,” *Int’l J. Commons* 7: 432-453.

7. Cole, Epstein & McGinnis (2014), “Digging deeper into Hardin’s pasture: the complex institutional structure of ‘the tragedy of the commons’,” *J. Inst. Econ. Mar.* 2014: 1-17.

Week 9: Your research topics or proposals

Week 10: Polycentricity and metropolitan governance

1. Geller (2004), “Tocquevillian Analytics,” conference paper from WOW3.

2. V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren (1961), “The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry,” *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 55: 831-842.

3. E. Ostrom (1996), “Governance of Local Communities” (unpublished manuscript)

4. Boettke, Palagashvili, and Lemke (2013), “Riding in cars with boys: Elinor Ostrom’s adventures with the police,” *J. Inst. Econ.* 9: 407-425.

5. E. Ostrom (1974), “Ventures in Teaching and Learning,” *A & S The Review* 10-17

6. Feiock (2009), “Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Collective Action,” *Urban Affairs Rev.* 44: 356-377.

7. Aligica and Tarko, “Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond,” *Governance* 25: 237-262.

Week 11: Polycentricity beyond metropolitan governance

1. Hooghe and Marks (2003), “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance,” *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 97: 233-243.

2. V. Ostrom (1973), “Can Federalism Make a Difference?” *Publius* 3: 197-237.

3. V. Ostrom (1969), “Operational Federalism: Organization for the Provision of Public Services in the American Federal System,” *Public Choice* 6: 1-17.

4. E. Ostrom (2010), “Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change,” *Global Env’tl Change* 20: 550-557.

5. Cole (2015), “Advantages of a polycentric approach to climate change policy,” *Nature Climate Change* 5: 114-118.

6. Andersson and E. Ostrom (2008), “Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective,” *Policy Sci.* 41: 71-93.

Week 12: The Ostroms and public choice

1. Mitchell (1988), “Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-Five Years of Public Choice and Political Science,” *Public Choice* 56: 101-119.

2. Boettke and Marciano (2014), “The past, present, and future of Virginia Political Economy,” *Public Choice* 163: 53-65.

3. V. Ostrom & E. Ostrom (1971), “Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration,” *PAR* 31: 203-216.

4. E. Ostrom (1998), “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action,” *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 92: 1-22.

5. V. Ostrom (1975), “Alternative Approaches to the Organization of Public Proprietary Interests,” *Nat. Res. J.* 15: 765-789.

6. V. Ostrom (2011), “Executive Leadership, Authority Relationships, and Public Entrepreneurship,” in B. Allen (ed.), Vincent Ostrom, *The Quest to Understand Human Affairs: Natural Resources Policy and Essays on Community and Collective Choice*, vol. 1. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, pp. 443-449.

Week 13: Development dilemmas

1. Radelet (2006), “A Primer on Foreign Aid,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 92.

2. Alesina and Dollar (2000), “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” *J. Econ. Growth* 5: 33-63.

3. Easterly (2003), “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” *J. Econ. Pers.* 17: 23-48.

4. E. Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993), "Analyzing the Performance of Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Sustaining Rural Infrastructure in Developing Countries," *J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory* 3: 11-45.
5. Araral (2005), "Bureaucratic incentives, path dependence, and foreign aid: An empirical institutional analysis of irrigation in the Phillipines," *Policy Sci.* 38: 131-157.
6. Ramalingam and Jones (2008), "Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and implications for development and humanitarian efforts," Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 295.
7. Sawyer (2005), "What African Analysts can learn from the Ostroms," *J. Econ. Behavior & Org.* 57: 237-240.
8. Leeson (2005), "Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy," *J. Econ. Behavior & Org.* 57: 241-244.

Week 14: Applying Workshop frameworks and methods to artifactualcommons

1. Madison, Frischmann, and Strandberg (2010), "Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment," *Cornell L. Rev.* 95: 657-709.
2. E. Ostrom (2010), "Response: The Institutional Analysis and Development framework and the Commons," *Cornell L. Rev.* 95: 807-815.
3. Frischmann (2005), "An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management," *Minnesota L. Rev.* 89: 918-1030.
4. Kunneke, Groenewegen, and Menard (2010), "Aligning modes of organization with technology: Critical transactions in the reform of infrastructures," *J. Econ. Behavior & Org.* 75: 494-505.
5. Hiatt (1975), "Protecting the Medical Commons: Who Is Responsible?" *N.E. J. Med.* 293: 235-241.
6. McGinnis (2013), "Caring for the Health Commons: What It is and Who's Responsible for It?" Ostrom Workshop Working Paper W13-5.

Week 15: Legacies and persisting challenges

1. Liu et al. (2007), "Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural Systems," *Sci.* 317: 1513-1516.
2. E. Ostrom (2012), "Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics," *RMM* 3: 51-65.
3. E. Ostrom (2007), "Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis," *J. Inst. Econ.* 3: 239-264.
4. Poteete and E. Ostrom (2003), "In Pursuit of Comparable Concepts and Data about Collective Action," CAPRI Working Paper No. 29.
5. Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis (forthcoming). "Toward a New Institutional Analysis of Social-Ecological Systems: Combining the IAD and SES frameworks"
6. Frischmann (2013), "Two enduring lessons from Elinor Ostrom," *J. Inst. Econ.* 9: 387-406.

ONLY three "EXCELLENT" groups will be selected.

W16: group study report-I

W17: group study report-II

W18: group study report-III

五、成績考核(Evaluation)

75% of the final course mark will derive from a 3,500 word assessed essay. The remaining marks will be derived from presentation (15%) and participation/attendance (10%).

六、可連結之網頁位址